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Abstract
Starting from the case of insurance claims, I investigate the dynamics
of acceptance, rejection and denial. I show that disagreement can be
more varied than one might think. I illustrate this by looking at the War-
ren/Sanders controversy in the 2020 democratic primaries and at reli-
gious agnosticism.
When an insured party incurs an expense, they may submit a claim for reim-
bursement. The insurance then reacts. They may accept the claim, reject it, or
deny it.
It’s clear enough what happens when the insurance accepts the claim: the
insured party receives the reimbursement requested. But what’s the difference
between a rejected claim and a denied one? When the insurance company
denies a claim, this means that they will not reimburse the medical expense.
By contrast, when the medical insurance rejects a claim, this does not mean
that they will not reimburse the medical expense – it only means that they do
not accept the claim, perhaps because it has not been filed properly or certain
information is missing. Something is wrong with the claim. The crucial differ-
ence is that while the insured party may resubmit a previously rejected claim,
which might then be accepted, this is not possible for a denied claim.
Despite this initial excursus, this article is not about medical billing, or the
philosophy of medicine for that matter. Rather, this article is about the dynam-
ics of acceptance, rejection and denial, so beautifully exemplified in our ex-
ample. (This doesn’t make insurance practices any more pleasant, of course.)
We are interested in how these dynamics play out in dialogue as well non-
verbal exchanges. So let’s start from a recent example.
We are in early January 2020. The setting is the democratic presidential
primaries. The day before the first democratic primary debate of the year, CNN
publishes a report alleging that in 2018, during a meeting in which Elizabeth
Warren communicated to Bernie Sanders her intention to run for president,
Sanders told Warren that a woman could not win in 2020. Shortly thereafter,
Kristen Orthman, Communications Director for Warren’s campaign, releases
a statement on Twitter from Warren saying that during the meeting the topic
came up of what would happen if the democrats nominated a female candid-
ate: Warren ‘thought a woman could win’ while Sanders ‘disagreed’.
Sanders, for his part, also releases a statement, this time to CNN. In the first
part of the statement, Sanders vehemently denies having said that a woman
could not win the presidential election:
It is ludicrous to believe that at the same meeting where Elizabeth
Warren told me she was going to run for president, I would tell her
that a woman couldn’t win. It’s sad that, three weeks before the
Iowa caucus and a year after that private conversation, staff who
weren’t in the room are lying about what happened.
In denying that he said that a woman could not win, Sanders is saying that he
did not say that a woman could not win. He is saying that the allegations of the
CNN report are false. Just as in the insurance example, Sanders is indicating
that he will not accept the claim that he said that a woman could not win.
Political commentators were quick to conclude that ‘somebody’s not telling
the truth’, as MSNBC’s Mika Brzezinski put it. (According to Brzezinski, it was
Elizabeth Warren who wasn’t telling the truth, but opinion was divided.) How-
ever, attention to the dynamics of acceptance, rejection and denial suggests a
different possibility. Let us consider the second part of Sanders’ statement to
the CNN:
What I did say that night was that Donald Trump is a sexist, a racist
and a liar who would weaponize whatever he could. Do I believe a
woman can win in 2020? Of course! After all, Hillary Clinton beat
Donald Trump by 3 million votes in 2016.
Sanders is here doing something which happens extremely frequently in cases
of disagreement about the truth of a certain claim. Having denied the claim –
having said that the claim is false – we make a counter-claim. In the insurance
case, you can imagine the insurance saying that although they deny the claim,
they will accept a different one, perhaps for a lower amount. In this particular
case, Sanders is saying that while he didn’t say that a woman could not win, he
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did say that Trump is a sexist and would use whatever he could to win. Now,
is this incompatible with the truth of what Warren said?
Recall that Warren’s recollection of what happened is that Sanders thought
that a woman could not win. Given the context – Warren informing Sanders of
her intention to run as a president – it would have been natural for Warren to
infer that, by saying that Trump is a sexist who would weaponize whatever he
could, Sanders was communicating that a woman could not win. As Warren
pointed out, she and Sanders disagreed. But note that, again taking both of
them at their word, it is implausible to think that they disagreed about the letter
of what Sanders said: surely Warren would agree with Sanders that Trump is
a sexist and a liar who would use the gender or ethnicity of his opponents to
win. Instead, the disagreement seems to concern what Warren took Sanders to
be implying – or implicating, using the terminology of philosopher Paul Grice –
namely that a woman could not win.1 Because she took Sanders to be implying
this, Warren rejected his claim even though she herself likely thought his claim
to be literally true. As in the insurance case, in rejecting a claim we are not
indicating that we will not accept it in the future, once the defects associated
with the claim are removed. In this particular case, suppose that Sanders were
to reiterate his claim that Trump is a sexist who would weaponize whatever he
can, but stressed that he doesn’t take this to imply that a woman could not win
– perhaps saying that he does believe that a woman could win (as he indeed
did in his statement to the CNN). Then there would be no reason for Warren
not to accept his claim.
Thus, one may reject a claim because one thinks that the claim is false –
one denies the claim. But one may reject the claim for other reasons. The
Sanders/Warren case brings this into sharp relief: assuming both Sanders and
Warren were telling the truth, what Warren did was to reject Sanders’ claim
because of its implications (or implicatures, again using Grice’s terminology).
There are other reasons different from falsity for rejecting a claim. A prom-
inent one is when one rejects a claim because it is not supported by the evid-
ence.2 A classic case of this sort concerns debate about the existence of God.
Imagine the religious person saying that there is a God. The atheist will want
to deny the claim: they think it’s false that there is a God. The case of the
agnostic, however, is different. The agnostic typically thinks that there isn’t
1Paul Grice, ‘Logic and Conversation’, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds), The Logic of
Grammar (Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975), 64–75.
2For more cases, see Luca Incurvati and Julian Schlöder, ‘Weak rejection’, Austalasian
Journal of Philosophy 95(4) (2017): 741–760.
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enough evidence for the existence of God and therefore rejects the claim that
there is a God. However, the agnostic does not want to deny that there is a
God, since they think that there isn’t enough evidence against the existence of
God either. Again, we have a clear analogy with the insurance case: the insur-
ance may reject a claim because the documentation provided is not sufficient
for the claim to be accepted. Instead of denying the claim, the insurance may
ask for further evidence that the expense has been incurred.
The foregoing observations shed light on the various forms that disagree-
ment can take. On a naïve picture, disagreement can only arise when one
party thinks that a certain claim is true whilst the other party thinks that the
claim is not true. However, paying close attention to the dynamics of making a
claim – what the philosophers call assertion – and rejection shows that this pic-
ture is too simple. There can indeed be disagreement of the kind adumbrated,
but there often occur disagreements of a different kind: one may disagree not
because one thinks that what the other party said is false, but because one
thinks that it is inappropriate in some other way, such as having undesirable
implications or not being adequately supported by evidence.3
3This work has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No
758540) within the project From the Expression of Disagreement to New Foundations for Ex-
pressivist Semantics.
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